What Is It Like to Be a Person?
Persons are those who have never not been loved by God.
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START FREE TRIAL NOWWhat Is It Like to Be a Person?
Persons are those who have never not been loved by God.
[.article__paragraph--cap][.small-caps]What is a person?[.small-caps] Philosophers have sometimes answered this question by starting with what a person can do, defining personhood in terms of powers or faculties. Boethius is representative in this regard, and he gives a concise definition along these lines in his Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius (written circa AD 512): a person is “an individual substance of a rational nature.” This definition has much to recommend it. It draws boundaries around the concept of “person” that are workable and extensible, with modifications and not without challenges, to cover many different instances of persons. On this definition, humans, angels, and God are all persons, even if the question of what makes them individuals needs further clarification. In each case, there is a something, a substance (a thing, rather than a quality like color). That substance or subject is rational; it has the powers of knowing and willing. To be a person is, at least, to be able to know, and to will according to what you know. Rocks and trees and bees are not persons because they lack knowledge and cannot decide to fall or to grow or to gather nectar. Persons, by contrast, are not determined to act by nature or instinct alone. Upon this ground it is possible to build a robust account of freedom, moral agency, and responsibility that explains what persons owe themselves and others. For all these reasons, this account of persons can be helpful. It comes with a set of philosophical tools ready to hand, which can be used for fine-grained analysis of human and, to the extent that we are able to theorize about them, angelic and divine action.[.article__paragraph--cap]
But this approach also comes with drawbacks. Insofar as this account of persons is founded upon rational capacities, it leaves open some lines of reasoning that Christians should resist. If, for example, rationality is definitional for personhood, then might we not also conclude that a human lacking rational powers lacks personhood? There are ways to avoid this conclusion. It is possible to say that being a creature with a rational nature means having those powers potentially even when they are not actually possessed at a given time. The very young or those suffering from dementia would still be persons even if they were not yet or no longer in a position to deploy their capacities for knowing and willing: they are still the kinds of subjects who can potentially understand and will. This is a good response for those who already have an account of human nature that can supply the necessary ballast. But it does need that ballast. If you were to take up the idea of rational capacities as essential for personhood without a strong set of metaphysical commitments about human nature, you could find yourself arriving at conclusions that run counter to Christian moral claims about human dignity.
A Christian notion of personhood should be able to account for the moral claims made by Christians about human beings and other persons. In doing so it must also answer the challenges of those seduced by arguments that deny personhood to those who lack rational capacities or grant personhood to things that present simulacra of those capacities. We are used to errors of the first kind. The need to come to the defense of the personhood of the very young, the very old, and the disabled, who, because they cannot exercise their reason, lack the ability to mount a defense, is a moral imperative. They are easy targets for dehumanization and murder because they cannot speak for themselves. The second error confronts us most glaringly in the case of large language models, computer programs that seem to speak for themselves. We are inclined to grant them the status of persons because they appear to do the sorts of things that until now only persons could do. Thinking carefully about the question of personhood with the resources of the Christian tradition can help us navigate these twin perils.
Instead of starting from a set of rational powers, another approach, the line pursued here, is to begin with the theological ground of personhood. We begin with inquiring about personhood as it relates to God. Christians worship a personal God. They understand themselves to be made in the image of that personal God. Personhood, for Christians, originates in God and is for relationship with God. This does not require rejecting Boethius’s formulation and the tradition that drew so fruitfully from it; it is compatible in large part with what we have traced above about the account of personhood that begins with a consideration of rational capacities. But this account argues that those capacities in created persons are a consequence of God’s call to a life of loving communion with him.
A created person is distinct from a divine person. Created personhood flows from and is dependent on God’s uncreated personhood. The God Christians confess is tripersonal – three persons in one divine nature. The content of this claim is difficult to grasp. As Augustine says in his De Trinitate, we say “three persons” in order to be able to answer the question, “Three what?”
Beginning with the language of scripture and of the creeds, we can offer an answer about the nature of persons and the personal nature of God that starts with the relations between the persons of the Trinity. Those relations, between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, constitute them as persons. The Father is the Father because he is the Father of the Son, the Son is the Son because he is the Son of the Father, and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son but proceeds from both. Each person of the Trinity is the One God and the three persons together are the One God. To be a divine person, so far as we can understand it, is to be in a set of constitutive relations with the other divine persons. To be a created person is to be made with the potential and purpose of entering into an analogous relation with God and with other created persons, angels and humans alike.
In Genesis 1, God takes counsel with himself, saying, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness” (26). This is one of the verses frequently cited by writers of the early church as scriptural support for the doctrine of the Trinity. Not only does God refer to himself plurally, he insists that humans be made like God according to this plurality – our image, our likeness. These observations about the creation of humans should lead us to three conclusions. The first is that being made in God’s trinitarian image means that humans, too, are persons, capable of and constituted by relationship with God and with one another. The second is that personal relationships, the sorts of constitutive relations that make us what we are, are rooted in language. The third is that being made in God’s image and according to God’s likeness can be distinguished, and that after the Fall this distinction marks out something important in human and angelic life.
First, God is a Trinity of persons. To be made in God’s image is to be a person too. As the divine persons are what they are by standing in a set of relations to the other divine persons, so also created persons are what they are by virtue of their relations. The principal difference between the uncreated persons of the Trinity and created persons, both human and angelic, is that created persons are dependent upon relations outside themselves. God is internally related to himself – one and the same substance just is the trinitarian persons. “Trinitas quae deus est (The Trinity that God is),” as Augustine says. Created persons are persons first because of their relations to God and second because of their relations to other created persons. To be a person is to be capable of relationship with both and to be fulfilled by relationship with both. This is at the heart of the twofold commandment to love God and neighbor (Mark 12:30–31, Matt. 22:37–39).
Second, we must say what exactly these constitutive relations are. Because all created things stand in an essentially dependent relation to God as well as a set of relations to all other created things, we have to be specific about the kinds of relations that belong to persons as persons. The relations that make creatures persons are rooted in language. God’s self-revelation in the words of scripture and revelation’s culmination in the Incarnation of the Word should make us amenable to this linguistic way of thinking about persons. In a slender volume entitled The New Creation, Herbert McCabe identifies the origins of theology, saying, “Theology exists because God did not only make man, he also spoke to him.” God’s speech to human beings reveals the height of human possibilities. To be a human person is to be called into a linguistic relationship with God and so also with other persons. The share in divine life for which created persons are made can be understood in terms of the sort of communion that language makes possible. To quote McCabe again, “We are creatures who are on speaking terms with God.” What does that linguistic relationship look like?
To return to Genesis 1, linguistic relations are on display when God creates humans. While God has spoken all of creation into existence, and while he has blessed the birds and the fishes, humans are the first creatures God has spoken to. “God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth’” (Gen. 1:28). This is the same task God has already conversed with himself about. It is now issued as a command. Humans have a vocation, a call or a summons, to a particular form of life. It is not surprising, then, that the first human response to this call to have dominion is itself a linguistic one – “whatever the man called every living creature, that was its name” (Gen. 2:19). The structure here is similar to that of God’s speech acts in Genesis 1: “God said … and it was so.” Humans exercise their dominion with language.
The response to God’s call is not complete in isolation. “It is not good that the man should be alone” (Gen. 2:18). After the narrative of creating, parading, and naming the animals, none are suitable companions for Adam. He remains alone insofar as he lacks another one who is, as the Vulgate translates it, “similem sui (like himself)” (Gen. 2:18). With the creation of Eve, Adam is no longer alone because he has someone rather than something to whom he can relate. She is capable, unlike the other animals, of speech and, with the exercise of language, of knowing and loving. Adam and Eve can relate to one another as persons and so enter into intimate communion, becoming “one flesh” (Gen. 2:24).
[.article__paragraph--cap][.small-caps]To be called and tasked[.small-caps] makes possible this sort of linguistic fulfillment. It also makes possible its refusal. Think of this in terms of an invitation. An invitation – to a friend’s home, to a party, to a position of employment – can be accepted or refused. Human persons are invited by God into a particular kind of life; his commands carry within them the implication of invitation. That life includes dominion over creation and communion with God and other persons. God makes humans with the capacity to accept this invitation. The grammar of acceptance includes knowing and willing. An offer has been extended. Knowing what that offer is, I can give my assent to it and accept it. I can also withhold my assent and refuse the invitation. To be invited requires this as well. An invitation that I cannot refuse fails to be an invitation and is instead an exercise of force.[.article__paragraph--cap]
God’s call to humans in the first two chapters of Genesis is refused when the terms of the invitation are violated. “Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat” (Gen. 2:17). The violation is described in terms of the exercise of language. This time the words used are mendacious. The serpent in the garden, which the Christian tradition has identified as the devil, a fallen angel, deceives Eve by lying: “You will not die” (Gen. 3:4). She eats, and Adam eats, and they find themselves naked and afraid. God, though, does not cut off linguistic relation with humans as a result of sin; he doubles down on it. He questions Adam and Eve. The next words uttered in scripture come from God, “Where are you?” (Gen. 3:9). God is not asking this question to gain information he lacks. It is a prompt, a further invitation to Adam and to the reader of scripture, to take stock of themselves. “Where am I?” in relation to God, to my neighbor, to myself. The following question, “Have you eaten of the tree of which I commanded you not to eat?” (Gen. 3:11) should be thought of similarly. God does not ask in order to find out but to invite Adam to confession, to truthful speech and contrition about willful disobedience. And Adam, and then Eve, use their speech to cast blame rather than accept it.
In the third place, the text of Genesis allows for making a useful distinction between being made in the image of God and being made in the likeness of God. Saint Bonaventure makes this distinction in his Breviloquium to illustrate the triadic quality of all created reality. Creation, Bonaventure explains, is necessarily marked with the trinitarian impress. To be anything at all is to have been brought into being by the Triune Lord and so to participate in that triunity, a braid elegantly plaited and suspended from eternity. The totality of created things offers no exception, and Bonaventure presents three ways creatures exist. In the first place, all things exist as traces or footprints of God. From the humblest to the grandest, all things bear the marks of their creator’s handiwork, being effects of God’s creative power. Secondly, some things also bear the image of God. This is evident in the rational faculties of humans and angels, both of which are possessed of intellect and will. Thirdly, creatures made in the image of God can be made according to God’s likeness insofar as they are sanctified and conformed to God through the gift of the Holy Spirit.
This distinction between image and likeness helps us to consider the state of created persons before and after the introduction of sin. Bonaventure argues, following Genesis 1:26, that humans were created bearing the image of God and were given the grace of conformity to God in holiness, making them likenesses too. This is the sort of life that created persons are made for. Sin distorts the image by bending it away from God, squandering the grace of likeness as well. The restorative work of Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God, makes possible the reordering of humans as images of God toward the sanctified conformity of likeness with God. This restores the relation of human persons with God and makes humans capable of realizing the full potential of created personhood.
[.article__paragraph--cap][.small-caps]To sum up, created persons[.small-caps] are what they are because of the sorts of relations they are capable of bearing to one another and to the uncreated persons of the Holy Trinity. Those relations are linguistic, a call and response. What is made possible by God’s call is the knowing and loving response of friendship with God and with one another. The human capacities of knowing and willing are downstream of this call and necessitated by it. Persons are free to know and to will, but this freedom contains the negative possibility of distortion, a failure to respond or to respond well. While God creates angelic and human persons for the sake of intellectual and loving communion with himself and others, the damage done by sin bends the person away from her highest possibilities and so limits her freedom. Instead of the image of God being elevated to likeness with God, created persons can decline those heights and instead conform themselves to created realities and fashion idols for themselves. The psalmist says of the idol-fashioners, “Those who make them are like them” (Ps. 115:8).[.article__paragraph--cap]
This approach allows us to describe divine, angelic, and human persons and their relations to one another. It incorporates the rational capacities of intellect and will without being reducible to them. It therefore has the resources to refuse arguments that would confine personhood to those who actively manifest those capacities. The Christian response to the claim that an infant in utero or a grandmother suffering from dementia fail to be persons is to point to their relationship with God. Humans are made for relationship with God, for loving communion with the persons of the Trinity. This is the ground of human dignity, even when the powers for knowing and willing appear to be absent. The psalmist asks, “Where can I go from your spirit? Or where can I flee from your presence?” (Ps. 139:7). There is no place to hide, not even when our rational faculties have failed. The same psalm praises God’s handiwork, “For it was you who formed my inward parts; you knit me together in my mother’s womb. I praise you for I am fearfully and wonderfully made” (Ps. 139:13–14). We are present to God in the hiddenness of the womb before our rational capacities have been actualized. Even more fundamentally the psalmist says, “Your eyes beheld my unformed substance. In your book were written all the days that were formed for me, when none of them as yet existed” (Ps. 139:16). We are present to God in the hiddenness of God’s own eternity. Created persons are those who have never not been loved by God.
To be a person is not to be able to demonstrate a certain range of rational capacities. Those capacities are features of the life of created personhood, even when those capacities are only potentially present, but they are the result of a prior call by God to live with him. To be a human or an angelic person is to be made for that kind of life. When a machine provides convincing exhibitions of powers that look like those of human knowing and willing, this does not make the machine a person. The simulacrum of rationality is what we should expect in artificial intelligence. We have made machines in our image. They can perform many of the tasks that human persons can, and so often strike people as belonging to the same category of thing. If personhood is rooted, however, in a creature’s having been summoned by God to loving communion with the Trinity, we do not have reason to suspect that even the most effective mimicry of human intelligence accomplishes this. Personhood is not an accomplishment but a gift of God that orders some of his creatures toward personal relationship with himself.
This account has the advantage of not relying on the strength of created human powers to justify our personhood. At a time when physician-assisted suicide is becoming more commonplace and abortion is readily accessible, a theological intervention that rests personhood on the strength and action of God is more secure. Seeing personhood as something that originates in God’s invitation to loving communion can offer someone reasons not to murder himself or terminate a pregnancy due to a physical or mental debility. The persuasive force of approaches to personhood that see the rational powers as its foundation leads almost effortlessly to the exclusion of whole classes of people from the community of persons. This exclusion is on haunting display when it ends in death and dismemberment. The Christian community should in this case remember the words of the apostle Paul, who refuses to put his trust in his own strength. Lacking rational powers is a weakness each human has lived through and likely will again. But the Lord says to Paul, “My power is made perfect in weakness” (2 Cor. 12:9). Not our power, but God’s power. Paul boasts in his weakness, “that the power of Christ may rest upon me” (2 Cor. 12:9). When your powers of knowing and willing fail, still “your life is hidden with Christ in God” (Col. 3:3).