The One Before the Ninety-Nine
Jesus is the purveyor of a new humanism.
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START FREE TRIAL NOWThe One Before the Ninety-Nine
Jesus is the purveyor of a new humanism.

[.article__paragraph--cap][.small-caps]Steven Spielberg’s[.small-caps] 1993 film Schindler’s List ends with a scene that is hard to watch. On the train tracks outside the labor camp, Oskar Schindler (Liam Neeson), surrounded by those of his employees he’s managed to save, laments the number of people he could have saved but didn’t. You can feel his sadness, his regret; anyone with even the most rudimentary knowledge of the Holocaust will understand why. Led by Itzhak Stern (Ben Kingsley), Schindler’s workers comfort him and thank him for what he did to save them. At the heart of the scene, Stern – who served as Schindler’s accountant – reminds Schindler of the value of what he did, using a quote from tractate Sanhedrin of the Babylonian Talmud, rendered into English in the script as, “Whoever saves one life saves the world entire.” Saving one person is like saving the whole world.[.article__paragraph--cap]
This principle – called pikuach nefesh, or “saving a life” – is the basis for a whole body of guidelines and norms in Judaism, one in which most, if not all, of the teachings called halakhah (guidelines focused on religious practice) are relativized when the life or needs of an individual human person are at stake. It is not that other principles are completely set aside. They are, however, reordered, put in second place behind the needs of the person. In other words, in times when the two might conflict, the value of human life (whether Jew or Gentile) and its associated needs takes precedence over most religious observances.
This idea is so well known, and also so popularized in literature and in films like Schindler’s List, that it might be tempting to think that it has always been taken for granted. But it hasn’t. Judicious readers of the Bible will notice that the principle of pikuach nefesh is a little difficult to find in the Old Testament; while for sure there are stories of extraordinary sacrifice and heroism, this idea of relativizing God’s commandments around the needs of the human person is at best hinted at or suggested, never quite realized or stated in so many words. Rather, for the most part, general well-being and prosperity are promised to those who are faithful to the commands of God.
According to what might be described as a prevailing view in ancient Israel, the moments of conflict out of which the pikuach nefesh principle arose ideally should not happen; if you do what God wants you to do, all your physical needs will be met and your life will not be endangered. God will give his angels charge over you so you do not dash your foot against a stone (Ps. 91:11f). And so on. Of course this is not true all the time; there are always exceptions to this kind of thing (see: the Book of Job.) But it is safe to say that it was a prevailing view.
However, at least by the time of the codification of the Mishnah (completed by the early third century), it seems as though something had changed. Something seems to have happened to the simple idea that if you do the right thing, God will take care of you. Scholars dispute when this change occurred; most have settled on the period of persecution under Antiochus IV Epiphanes (175–164 BC) as the beginning of a shift in worldview. The seminal article in Harvard Theological Review by David Flusser, “A New Sensitivity in Judaism and the Christian Message” (1968) captures this shift most eloquently, and a small chain of articles in various journals have explored the same theme since. Religious persecution seems to have forced Israel’s leaders, teachers, and sages to rethink this belief. The torture and martyrdom of the righteous broke down what had been, in their minds, an almost inviolable link between doing the right thing and having good things happen to you.
What emerged instead was, to use Flusser’s phrase, a “new sensitivity” to the worth of each individual, a conviction that his or her needs must take precedence over religious observance. Historians make this argument because it seems as though that period of persecution seeded the literary ground, so to speak, for a whole crop of texts that focus on the human being and center human needs. The change in worldview could be described as follows: if religious observance is not a guarantee of immediate, concrete, or even commensurate reward in this world – if, in other words, the rewards for doing the right thing are no longer predictable – why not focus on the one thing that is within reach and that produces predictable results: seeing and caring for the needs of the people around you? It is not as though anyone advocated for rejecting religious observance; it is just that a reordering of priorities seems to have slowly taken place.

[.article__paragraph--cap][.small-caps]Popular perception[.small-caps] points to the Talmud as a repository for this kind of thinking, and indeed, the Talmud does contain a multitude of applications of this theme. The Talmudic sages did not invent this idea, though; that came several generations earlier, in the work of a small group of sages who taught from the first century BC until the turn of the millennium. Jesus, in my view, was one of the most eloquent purveyors of this new humanism.[.article__paragraph--cap][.small-caps]
What, after all, is the parable of the lost sheep other than a most profound expression of this idea? Jesus’ interlocutors challenge him about his freedom in sharing meals with people who would (in their view) be under a kind of prohibition because of their ritual state: a “sinner” is one who is in any way outside the boundaries of normative observance (Luke 15). Jesus’ reply brilliantly captures this new attitude to the individual person and his or her needs: if there are ninety-nine sheep who are safe and one who is in trouble, preference is given to the one over the many. It is not that the many are rejected; it is just that the business of saving the one, even though that one be a sinner, is at that moment more important.
And by the same token, Jesus suggests that the right move is to go after, seek, and find the one who is “lost” in the same way that one who had lost a coin would spare no effort until the coin was found. Further, who, having read the parable of the lost son, can forget just how eloquently this theme is explained therein? The father and the older son have everything. They do not need the younger son to come back. And prudence and wisdom would suggest that the right treatment for this young man would be punishment, followed, perhaps, by slow restoration. But this new humanism, this love for the individual, changes everything. Instead of shame and anger, there is welcome and celebration.
Or take Jesus’ healing miracles. Many of them – in fact, almost all of them – involve the contravention of some halakhic point over which the Pharisees had argued, in favor of meeting the needs of an individual in distress. In one incident, recorded in Luke 6, the scribes and Pharisees watch Jesus to see if he would perform a healing on the Sabbath, and Jesus heals a man with a withered hand. In a saying that sounds like it was taken directly from the Talmud, Jesus asks them, “Is it lawful to do good or to do harm on the Sabbath, to save life or to destroy?” Centuries later, the whole body of law under which one might justify stepping outside halakhic norms in order to help someone in distress was developed as pikuach nefesh. This whole thing – perhaps especially Jesus’ rejoinder to their suspicion – must have been quite a surprise for the Pharisees and scribes; Luke records that they were anoias, “clueless,” about what to do with Jesus.
In the same way, most of the subtle punch and power of the story of when Jesus raised the widow’s son at Nain (Luke 7:11–19) comes from how the narrator describes the contravention of halakhic norms around care for an individual. In a religious and social setting in which physical contact with a corpse imputed ritual impurity, Jesus could well have performed the whole miracle by words alone, not by touch. But that is not how it happened. He “touched the bier.” It is almost as though he were telling the bystanders that when a human life is at stake, who cares about the other stuff? Jesus would not, of course, have said that about moral laws; it is interesting that these moments of conflict arise mostly when norms around Jewish ritual practice are at stake, not key ethical or moral principles.
The examples of this theme in Jesus’ teachings are many. Even his explication of the kingdom of God and its establishment is cast as God’s love for the one over the many: Jesus teaches that the kingdom is like a “merchant, in search of fine pearls; on finding one pearl of great value, he went and sold all that he had and bought it.” (Matt. 13:45f) The kingdom, in other words, is based in part on what we might have thought is unreasonable: imprudent love of the individual human person. The way Jesus conducts his teaching and ministry reflects this same concern: his whole story moves forward not based on a series of great speeches to huge crowds (although those are there, for sure) but rather through individual encounters.
Jesus breaks bread with individuals. Even though the house of Simon the Pharisee was probably full of people, according to the way the narrator records the event, it could just as well have been two people and no one else. Jesus seems to like interacting with one person at a time, giving all his attention to the individual over the many. He heals individuals too; although there are many stories of crowds getting healed, it is the stories of individual healings – themselves no more remarkable than the group healings – that stick in our minds: the Gerasene demoniac, the daughter of Jairus, the centurion’s slave, and so on. Jesus calls individuals by name; that, after all, is how Mary recognizes him in the garden after his resurrection: not because he looked the same, but because of the way he said her name. And then there is, of course, Lazarus: Jesus’ friend has died, and, in his grief, he overturns the regime of death in advance of his own resurrection for this one man. Whoever saves one life saves the world entire.
The one over the many. The needs of the individual over the norms of the group. Human needs over religious needs. In Jesus’ view, even plain old hunger can be a reason to walk the edge of halakhic norms around something like Sabbath observance: his disciples, hungry though not starving, are free to pick and eat grain because “the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath” (Mark 2:23–28).
Jesus’ unique gift of sensing and responding to the needs – even emotional ones – of those with whom he interacted is never so strongly represented as in his conversation with the thief on the cross. Simply because he asked to be remembered, Jesus promised him entry into paradise. He understood what the man needed, and gave it to him. I don’t think Jesus meant to say anything about the theological nature of salvation there; I think he just cared about that man.
Those stories – the encounters with individuals, the healing of individuals, the care for individuals, the teaching about the value of the individual – are what carry the weight in the Gospels. Again, we’re not talking about absolutes; there is no shortage of exceptions to this trend. We’re also not talking about rejection of one thing in favor of another; Jesus didn’t seem to work that way, and he came “not to abolish but to fulfill.” This is just to highlight a fascinating and important historical trend in the development of ideas toward a more humanist approach in fulfilling the requirements and norms of Torah – an approach in which, when a halakhic norm came into conflict with caring for human needs, the right thing to do would have been to care for the person and his needs first.
And all of it precedes by several centuries the recording of the famous dictum in the Talmud that Itzhak Stern quotes to Oskar Schindler in that scene at the train tracks.

[.article__paragraph--cap][.small-caps]It is with some familiarity,[.small-caps then, that one turns to the writings of the Talmudic sages. Like Jesus, they, too, explicate the principle of the value of the individual with power, beauty, and sometimes no small amount of humor.[.article__paragraph--cap]]
Sometimes, they take the most extreme hypothetical as a way of teaching something, not unlike the overstatement about cutting off your hand or tearing out your eye. For instance, in the tractate titled Shabbat, it is recorded that Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel (10 BC–AD 70) taught that given the choice between desecrating the Sabbath and saving the life of a one-day-old baby, in order to save the life of a one-day-old baby it is encouraged to desecrate the Sabbath. “Desecrate one Sabbath, so he [the baby] can observe many Sabbaths.” Rabbi Shimon is taking a hypothetical position, obviously, and as only a Talmudic sage would, he pushes the hypothetical to the extreme, saying that even if the deceased King David were to ask you to desecrate the Sabbath, you shouldn’t. But for a one-day-old living baby, you should (b. Shabbat 151b:8). Human life and its preservation trump the Sabbath. It is interesting to note that Rabbi Shimon may well have been friends with Paul, during the time when, as Saul, he had “sat at the feet” of Gamaliel, Rabbi Shimon’s father (Acts 22:3); he was fifteen years Saul’s elder, but they were Gamaliel’s disciples at the same time.
This same principle holds in all kinds of situations. In Mishnah Yoma it is recorded that the sages held that if a pregnant woman has cravings (even cravings brought on by smell) it is permissible to prepare food for her even if Sabbath restrictions might be contravened in the process, since failure to do so might endanger the life of the mother or the baby. The same is true for someone who is ill and needs food: it is permitted to feed them, whatever Sabbath restrictions are violated (m. Yoma 8:5–6).
Other records of rabbinic discussions on this theme include such things as the allowability of contravening kosher guidelines in order to feed someone who is starving (Yoma 83a:11–13), or the ironclad rule that if you see someone in any type of mortal distress, for any reason, you are required to do what you can to save him or her immediately, without consulting a rabbi (b. Sanhedrin 73a:7). In another Talmudic discussion, the sages gently mock one who, for reasons of propriety, will not save a woman drowning in a river for fear of looking at her in a way that is “not proper” (b. Sotah 21b:5). In another version of the same discussion, recorded in a different text, the sages ridicule one who sees a child struggling in a river and stops to take off his phylacteries before going into the water to save the child.
[.article__paragraph--cap][.small-caps]So what are we supposed[.small-caps] to make of all this? I find it interesting that Jesus’ explication of the principle of pikuach nefesh predates by at least several decades even the earliest written forms of the Talmudic wisdom. Even though there is such a large gap in time between the two sources, they are essentially saying the same thing. What can we learn from this?[.article__paragraph--cap]
A culture such as ours, beset by concerns of efficiency, even efficiency in doing good, as in the case of the effective altruism movement, would do well to pay attention to this ancient wisdom, which both Jesus and the rabbis illuminated so well. The human person matters. The individual matters. The one before the ninety-nine: he is the first object of your care.
This slow reorganization of all ethics around the value of individual human life is a lesson we, too, can learn. We will most likely all find ourselves at one point or another sobbing in grief over missed opportunities, just like Oskar Schindler. But in the meantime, in light of the myriad challenges we face that militate against the individual human life and its needs, we can start with one good choice at a time, knowing that in saving even one life, it is as though one has saved the whole world.