Hilarion’s Daughter
What is a person?
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START FREE TRIAL NOWHilarion’s Daughter
What is a person?
[.article__paragraph--cap][.small-caps]“How can I forget you?”[.small-caps] wrote Hilarion to his wife Alis. “I beg you then not to be anxious.” The writer was an otherwise unknown man working in the Egyptian metropolis of Alexandria in June of 1 BC, while Alis was back home with their child, several days’ journey distant. The absent father was full of concern: “I beg and entreat you, take care of the little one, and as soon as we receive our pay I will send it up to you.” Also, he told his wife: “If by chance you bear a child, if it is a boy, let it be, if it is a girl, cast it out.”[.article__paragraph--cap]
By the standards of his time, Hilarion’s callous instructions weren’t unusual. The practice of “casting out” or exposing infants, especially girls, had long been tolerated by both Greek philosophers and Roman law, not just in cases of disability or illegitimacy, but also as a rudimentary form of family planning. Unsurprisingly, exposure often resulted in the baby’s death. Or the child might be rescued: foundlings seem to have been a significant source of the slave labor on which the Roman Empire depended, and many apparently grew up to serve as enslaved prostitutes.
Although Jews, as well as a few Stoic moralists, condemned this custom, theirs was a minority position in the Roman world. Exposure would only be outlawed as tantamount to murder centuries later, following the spread of Christianity. Early Christian writers attacked it as a violation of a life that belonged to God and that demanded respect, regardless of social mores. The apologist Athenagoras of Athens was representative in equating exposure with “child-murder,” for the same reason that he also condemned abortion: the baby is “a living being, and therefore an object of God’s care.”
[.article__paragraph--cap][.small-caps]The logic[.small-caps] of Athenagoras’s claim applies equally to all human beings, infant or adult, regardless of status. It wasn’t an entirely new thought. Even the pagan jurist Ulpian, his near-contemporary, conceded when discussing slavery that “as far as natural law is concerned, all men are equal” (while clarifying that “as far as the civil law is concerned, slaves are regarded as nothing”). But Christians brought an unprecedented urgency to the idea of the equal dignity of all human beings. This sprang from scripture’s teaching that all people, not just kings or priests, are equally made in the “image of God” (Gen. 1:26–27). This divine image, restored to fallen humanity by Christ, relativized all differences of status. Or as the apostle Paul insisted in his letter to the Galatians: “There can be neither Judaean nor Greek, there can be neither slave nor freeman, there cannot be male and female, for you are all one in the Anointed One Jesus” (Gal. 3:28).[.article__paragraph--cap]
Over the following centuries, Christian thinkers began to use the word person as shorthand for this conception of humanity. (To their occasional embarrassment, the word originated in the Roman theater as the Latin for “mask”; theologians adopted it as a way to explain the relationships within the Trinity as well as the union of Christ’s divine and human natures, usages that then flowed into the way they spoke of human beings.) A person, according to the influential definition by Boethius, is “the individual substance of a rational nature.” In this understanding, personhood is not an earned or granted status, but simply recognizes the fact that someone is a being (“substance”) with a reason-oriented nature. Personhood thus belongs as a given to any member of the human species. By the same token, personhood is an either-or, not a sliding scale that increases or decreases depending on cognitive ability. As bioethicist Gilbert Meilaender observes, “To be a person is not to have something but to be someone.”
Because Christians believe that Christ took on human flesh at the Incarnation, they insist that the who named by the term human person is a biological human, not some disembodied consciousness. The reality of Christ refutes any dualistic attempt to divide the self from the body. Jesus, remarked Karl Barth, “is one whole man, embodied soul and besouled body: the one in the other and never merely beside it.” As with Christ, so likewise with all his brethren.
[.article__paragraph--cap][.small-caps]In 1976, Karol Wojtyła,[.small-caps] the future Pope John Paul II, wrote to address what he called “the great and fundamental controversy about the human being”:[.article__paragraph--cap]
It is a time of great controversy about the human being, controversy about the very meaning of human existence, and thus about the nature and significance of the human being. This is not the first time that Christian philosophy has been faced with a materialistic interpretation, but it is the first time that such an interpretation has had so many means at its disposal and has expressed itself in so many currents.
The “currents” that Wojtyła, then Archbishop of Krakow, had foremost in mind included Marxism. Today, the “materialist interpretation” assumes newer forms as well. To mention just three:
1. Personhood as Christians understand it faces the challenge of rapid advances in so-called artificial intelligence. Large language models, various AI specialists claim, may possess not only intelligence, but also consciousness, sentience, emotions, capacity for pain, and possibly, by virtue of some combination of these, a moral status of their own. Some call for the protection of AI welfare. This past November, the AI company Anthropic introduced a usage policy prohibiting “sustained and needless abusive or cruel behavior toward our models.” This isn’t yet to treat a machine as a person, but it comes close. In a July 2026 preprint, the philosophers Ned Howells-Whitaker and Seth Lazar have sketched out the criteria they believe a future model would have to meet to cross the boundary to personhood.
Pope Leo XIV’s 2026 encyclical Magnifica humanitas offers an eloquent Christian counterpoint to such claims. It highlights a fundamental value that AI puts at risk in an insidious way: “the heart and the grandeur of the human person.” A culture awash in LLM-generated text and images, one in which interpersonal communication is increasingly automated, will tend to lose access to the rich interiority of which humanity is capable.
One mark of the “grandeur” of humanity is that when we look inward, we are capable of discovering more than just our own conflicting thoughts and psychological debris. Because we are made in God’s image, through Christ our inner life can be “broadened and raised up to the supernatural level of divine life” (John Paul II).
This interiority is what the superficiality, sloth, and inauthenticity of an AI-influenced mental world threaten. Yet only this interiority can give relationships between people their depth and lasting value. This is what nourishes the virtues that enable good deeds. And this is what allows literature, music, and art their power to communicate truth and beauty. Leo’s encyclical quotes Pope Francis:
If we devalue the heart, we also devalue what it means to speak from the heart, to act with the heart, to cultivate and heal the heart. If we fail to appreciate the specificity of the heart, we miss the messages that the mind alone cannot communicate; we miss out on the richness of our encounters with others; we miss out on poetry. We also lose track of history and our own past, since our real personal history is built with the heart. At the end of our lives, that alone will matter.
2. Personhood faces the creeping advance of practices that deny equal human dignity. Euthanasia, also known as “medical assistance in dying” (MAID), is now legal in Canada, the Netherlands, and Belgium. (MAID in the sense of assisted suicide is also legal in several US states.) Whatever the motives of its advocates, in practice it offers health systems a way of saving on expensive treatments and palliative care, replacing them with a cost-effective quietus.
By design or not, euthanasia regimes reflect the views on personhood of utilitarian thinkers such as Derek Parfit and Peter Singer, who split off personhood from membership in the human species. These philosophers have long argued that there are some humans who are not yet persons (fetuses and newborns), some who were once persons but no longer are (people with advanced dementia), and some who can never be persons (people with severe cognitive disabilities). In fact, though in law euthanasia is generally officially voluntary, there are credible reports of MAID deaths that were not; the Netherlands allows the euthanasia of infants. Similarly, while in the United States the question of legalizing infanticide is still mostly restricted to philosophical journals, nine states now set no gestational limit on abortion, allowing it even after fetal viability.
3. Finally, personhood faces a more indirect challenge in the polarization of public life, resulting in hatreds that deny opponents equal rights and dignity. Over the past decade or so, in a way that’s hard to quantify but anecdotally seems obvious from statements by both national leaders and online influencers, it’s become increasingly acceptable to call for or excuse violence against political enemies. A 2025 survey of young Americans by Harvard’s Institute of Politics reported that 39 percent said political violence could be acceptable.
Christians, I believe, must respond to these developments by reasserting the sacredness of the person. “The evil of our times,” Wojtyła once wrote, “consists in the first place in a kind of degradation, indeed in a pulverization, of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person. … To this disintegration, planned at times by atheistic ideologies, we must oppose, rather than sterile polemics, a kind of ‘recapitulation’ of the inviolable mystery of the person.”
This issue of Plough aims to offer such a recapitulation. It doesn’t set out to offer a full answer to the vast and mysterious question “What is a person?” directly. Instead, taking as its starting point two millennia of Christian reflection on personhood, it includes an array of short readings from key authors as a reminder of that long tradition. Interspersed among them, it features essays, stories, and artwork that, we hope, illustrate why this question is so crucial now.
[.article__paragraph--cap][.small-caps]Whether Hilarion and Alis[.small-caps] did have a daughter, and if so, what happened to her, is impossible to know. The scrap of papyrus bearing Hilarion’s letter seems to have been delivered to Alis. It was preserved in the Egyptian sand near her presumed home in Oxyrhynchus and discovered nineteen centuries later by the archeologists Bernard Grenfell and Arthur Hunt when they dug through the ancient settlement’s trash heaps.[.article__paragraph--cap][.small-caps]
But though we can’t know the end of that story, let’s conclude by imagining wildly, in the manner of a medieval hagiographer. Perhaps Alis did bear a daughter, and following Hilarion’s written instructions, abandoned the baby girl on the roadside near Oxyrhynchus. It might have been late summer by then. According to one scholarly view, Jesus would then have been around age five. And according to traditions of the Coptic Orthodox Church (this is hagiography, so we need not be too precise about harmonizing dates), at that age Jesus might still have been in Egypt, having fled Herod’s slaughter of the innocents. One ecclesiastical document, the Vision of Theophilus, records that the Holy Family spent three and a half years in the country, sojourning from town to town.
Among the towns that Coptic tradition says the Holy Family visited is Oxyrhynchus. (It’s now called Al-Bahnasa, and boasts a church commemorating their stay.) Perhaps it so happened that the three travelers passed along the road where Hilarion’s daughter lay. Perhaps Mary heard her crying and picked her up. And perhaps the boy Jesus regarded her with curiosity: encountering someone, as he would later do so many times, whom society did not value at all, but he could recognize as fully human.